Risk-limiting audits for score voting systems

Document Type : Full Length Article

Authors

School of Mathematics, Iran University of Science and Technology

10.22061/jdma.2025.11534.1108

Abstract

Several voting systems are utilized to allocate both political and non-political positions across countries worldwide. Plurality voting and approval voting are among the most widely implemented electoral systems. Established statistical methods are employed
to ensure the accuracy of vote counting and the validation of election results. Two fundamental approaches that significantly enhance the likelihood of identifying errors in election outcomes are Risk-limiting audit (RLA) and Bayesian audit (BA). These audit methods assess the security of elections using statistical tools, based on the random selection of cast
votes and their interpretation as evidence supporting or contradicting the reported results. In this paper, we first examine the advantages of a specific form of approval voting, referred to as score voting, and then describe two types of risk-limiting audits to evaluate the accuracy of vote counting and the results. The proposed auditing method for score voting is adapted from the Ballot-polling risk-limiting audits to verify outcomes (BRAVO). Simulation results confirm the effectiveness and accuracy of our approach.

Graphical Abstract

Risk-limiting audits for score voting systems

Keywords

Main Subjects

Journal of Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications
Volume 10, Issue 2
June 2025
Pages 207-221

Files

History

  • Receive Date: 11 December 2024
  • Revise Date: 06 January 2025
  • Accept Date: 08 March 2025
  • Publish Date: 01 June 2025

Share

How to cite

Statistics